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DUST, DETERMINISM, AND FRANKFURT: 
A REPLY TO GOETZ 
Eleonore Stump 
In a preceding issue of Faith and Philosophy Stewart Goetz criticized a paper of 
mine in which 1 try to show that libertarians need not be committed to the princi-
ple of alternative possibilities (PAP) and that Frankfurt-style counterexamples to 
PAP are no threat to libertarianism. In my view, the main problem with Goetz's 
arguments is that Goetz does not properly understand my position. In this 
paper, I respond to Goetz by summarizing my position in as plain a way as pos-
sible. Goetz's charge against my position has two parts, first, that it isn't libertari-
an and, second, that it provides no good reason for libertarians to abandon PAP. 
This paper briefly presents my answers to these two parts of Goetz's charge. 
Introduction 
In a preceding issue of Faith and Philosophy! Stewart Goetz criticized a 
paper of mine2 in which T try to show that libertarians need not be commit-
ted to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) and that Frankfurt-
style cow1terexamples to PAP are no threat to libertarianism. Tn my view, 
the main problem with Goetz's arguments is that Goetz does not properly 
understand my position. Rather than pointing out the ways in which my 
position is misconstrued, it seems to me more helpful to try to summarize 
it in as plain a way as possible. Goetz's charge against my position has two 
parts, first, that it isn't libertarian and, second, that it provides no good rea-
son for libertarians to abandon PAP. I will divide my summary into two 
parts to correspond to these two parts of Goetz's charge. 
The heart of my position can be thought of this way. "Dust thou art and 
LIDtO dust shalt thou return", says Genesis, in the old King James English. 
Ecclesiastes says, "The dust shall return to the earth as it was, and the spirit 
shall return to God who gave it". These two passages, as well as others, 
have convinced Christians in past ages that the belief that a human person 
is made out of matter is somehow compatible with the claim that human 
beings have souls which can exist separated from bodies.' The view com-
monly described (rightly or wrongly) as Cartesian dualism" takes a different 
view of human persons. On that view, a human person is a soul; and the 
essentially human acts of thinking and willing take place only in a soul, not 
in a body. For both theological and philosophical reasons, including the cur-
rent philosophical disrepute of Cartesian dualism, 1 think it is worth consid-
ering what difference it makes to our understanding of moral responsibility 
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if we take seriously the notion that a human person is made of matter. 
In my view, this notion is compatible with a rejection of causal deter-
minism, so that human acts of will are indeterministic. On the other hand, 
however, as I will explain below, taking seriously the material constitution 
of human persons makes it easier to construct Frankfurt stories in which an 
agent acts with moral responsibility, and also indeterministically, and yet 
is unable to act otherwise than she does. An agent's willing indeterministi-
cally is therefore not equivalent to her being able to do otherwise. 
Consequently, although focusing on the material nature of human beings 
strengthens the case against PAP, rejecting PAP is compatible with suppos-
ing that there are indeterministic human acts. The Frankfurt stories are suf-
ficient to show PAP false, but they aren't nearly sufficient to show that 
morally responsible acts can be causally determined. 
To answer each part of Goetz's charge, in what follows I try to spell out 
briefly what I take to be the implications of the view that human beings are 
made of matter for libertarianism and for the principle of alternative possi-
bilities. 
Libertarianism 
In other papers (one of which is the focus of Goetz's attack), I have 
argued for what I take to be the view of moral responsibility held by 
Thomas Aquinas.' According to Aquinas, human beings are morally 
responsible for at least some of their actions, and causal determinism is 
false. In particular, no acts of will for which a person is morally responsible 
are causally determined by anything outside the willer.' At least for nor-
mal, sane persons, most acts of intellect are not causally determined either? 
Nonetheless, as I interpret him/ Aquinas also rejects the principle of alterna-
tive possibilities. That is, Aquinas thinks an agent can be morally responsi-
ble for an act even if he couldn't have done otherwise. As I have argued 
elsewhere/ this is not because Aquinas thinks that human beings never 
have alternative possibilities when they are morally responsible for what 
they do. On the contrary, most or virtually all of the time, a morally respon-
sible human being does have alternative possibilities for what she does, on 
Aquinas's view. But for Aquinas, the presence of alternative possibilities is 
an accidental characteristic of moral responsibility; it isn't essential to it. So, 
in certain sorts of cases, it is possible for a human being to act with moral 
responsibility when only one course of action is available to her. 
What is essential to moral responsibility on Aquinas's view is that a per-
son be the ultimate source of what she does, that her intellect and will be 
the ultimate causes of her acts.lO By 'ultimate cause' here, I mean that there 
is nothing which is prior to that person's acts of intellect and will and 
which causally determines her intellect and will to be in the states in which 
they are. If we can trace a causal chain of any sort backward from an 
agent's act, then the causal chain must originate only in acts of her will and 
intellect. That is, for any act which the agent does, if there is any causal 
chain at all of which that act is the effect, then the causal chain must have a 
first or ultimate cause, and that ultimate cause cannot be anything other 
than an act of the agent's own will or intellect. ll 
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If we think of libertarianism, in the common way, as the position which 
supposes that human beings are sometimes morally responsible for their 
acts but that moral responsibility is incompatible with causal determinism, 
then Aquinas's account of moral responsibility is a species of libertarian-
ism. Furthermore, within the group of philosophical positions which hold 
that human beings are sometimes morally responsible, the two main kinds 
are compatibilism and libertarianism. Aquinas thinks people are morally 
responsible, and he expressly rejects compatibilism. So it's natural to count 
him among the libertarians. 
On the other hand, if someone objects strongly to this terminology, it's 
perfectly possible to find another generic name. We can pick the Greek, 
rather than the Latin, analogue to 'freedom', and we can designate a genus 
of philosophical positions 'eleutherianism'. Eleutherianism can then be 
divided into two species. One species holds that (i) human beings are 
sometimes morally responsible for their acts, that (ii) moral responsibility 
is incompatible with causal determinism, and that (iii) moral responsibility 
requires alternative possibilities. The other species, represented by 
Aquinas's position, holds (i) and (ii) but not (iii). We can then reserve 'lib-
ertarianism' for the first species. 
But it seems to me silly to squabble over names in this way and to pro-
liferate technical terminology. Both species are committed to (i) and (ii), 
and they differ only in (iii). Given that (i) and (ii) are sufficient to distin-
guish a position from both determinism and compatibilism, it seems to me 
better to say that there are two species of libertarianism, one of which 
accepts and the other of which rejects PAP. 12 
There is one other point about libertarinism which is important to make 
clear in this context. 
Aquinas knew a view virtually identical to what is now called 
'Cartesian dualism'; he associated it with Platonism, and he repudiated it 
strenuously, in large part because he thought it isn't compatible with the 
claim that a human being is made of matter. Because he had little under-
standing of the way the brain works, some of what Aquinas thought about 
the relation between brain and mind is primitive or just false. Even now, 
we don't understand very much about the brain, but what we know just 
confirms the conclusion that Platonic or Cartesian dualism is wrong; there 
is a much stronger connection between mind and brain than Cartesian 
dualism supposes. For this reason, and those raised in the introduction to 
this paper, I think it is worth considering non-Cartesian accounts of the 
relation between mind and brain and asking what species of libertarianism 
is compatible with them. 
On most contemporary philosophical and biological theories of the 
mind and brain, there is at least a correlation between mental states and 
neural states. By saying that mental states are correlated with neural states, 
I mean to claim that there is a strong connection between a mental act or 
state and a neural state, but to leave general and vague the precise nature 
of that connection in order to accommodate a variety of different contem-
porary theories. For example, those who think that the mental is identical 
to the physical can suppose that mental acts or states and sequences of 
neural firings are correlated because the mental acts or states are the neural 
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sequences or states. On the other hand, even non-Cartesian dualists will-
ing to accept a correlation between mental and neural states can be accom-
modated here. It is open to them to interpret the correlation as states of 
soul and body which are somehow strongly and invariably connected. 
They might suppose, for example, that what happens in the soul is always 
mirrored at the same time by what happens in the body and vice versa, so 
that affecting the brain with drugs or other medical intervention results in 
a simultaneous alteration in the soul, and changes in the soul are matched 
at the same time by a change in the brain. 
Causal determinism and reductionism have so strong a hold on many 
contemporary philosophers that connecting the mind to the brain in this 
way will seem to them to entail that mental states are causally determined 
by, and perhaps even reducible to, the physical states of the brain, which 
are in tum causally determined by things outside the agent. Both those who 
accept libertarianism and those who reject it are likely to suppose libertari-
ans are committed to the position that the human will has a capacity not 
shared by anything else in the world, including brain states, namely, the 
capacity to initiate causal chains and to escape the great nexus of causation 
that inexorably binds everything else in the world. To philosophers under 
the spell of this view, it will seem impossible to accept a correlation between 
mental and neural states of the sort I have just outlined and also to accept 
libertarianism. To hold that a mental act is strongly correlated with a causal 
chain of neural firings in the brain will seem to such philosophers to give up 
the heart of libertarianism. That's because, on this sort of view, neural states 
- unlike libertarian acts of will - are part of a causal chain that extends 
outside the agent and doesn't stop until its origin in the big bang. 
But reductionism, and also causal determinism, have come under 
increasing attack in recent years, especially in philosophy of biology, for 
reasons that have nothing to do with moral responsibility or human 
agentsY I concur with those arguments. There is no space in this short 
paper to spell them out;!4 but if they are sound, and I think they are, then 
we should reject both reductionism and causal determinism, not only for 
human agents but also for mice, rocks, and molecules. So, I think it is possi-
ble to hold that mental states and neural states are strongly correlated and 
also to maintain that there are states of intellect and will which are not 
caused by anything else. Therefore, the understanding of mental acts and 
states as strongly correlated with neural sequences and neural states is 
compatible with one of the main tenets of libertarianism, namely, that acts 
of will for which a person is morally responsible are indeterministic. 
So 1 think we can accept the view that a human person is made out of 
matter and be libertarians as well. 
PAP and Frankfurt stories 
Does the claim that human beings sometimes act with moral responsi-
bility and that morally responsible acts are indeterministic commit us to 
accepting PAP? If human beings are made out of matter, then, in my view, 
the answer is 'no'. Perhaps the will of a Cartesian spirit can't be controlled 
by anything besides the person who is that spirit, but the will of a material-
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ly constituted human being can. If causal determinism is false, even a 
material human person can initiate causal chains; he can control himself. 
But anything made out of matter, including the intellect and will of human 
beings, can also be externally controlled. 
Ordinary Frankfurt-style counterexamples to PAP are built around pre-
emption. In such Frankfurt stories, there is a controller who has a mecha-
nism that is responsive to a state in the victim which is antecedent to the act 
the controller wants to control. For example, in one of the most discussed 
Frankfurt stories, a neurosurgeon has a neuroscope which detects Jones's 
inclination to vote a certain way. If the neurosurgeon were to detect Jones's 
inclination to vote in a way the neurosurgeon doesn't want him to vote, the 
neurosurgeon would preempt Jones's own decision and cause Jones to 
decide to vote in the way the neurosurgeon desires. But if there were no 
reliable preceding sign, such as an inclination, it seems that the neurosur-
geon couldn't preempt Jones's own decision. By the time the neurosurgeon 
knew whether he should intervene or not, Jones would already have made 
a decision. So w1less there is some reliable sign of how the victim is going to 
decide, the neurosurgeon can't preempt the victim's decision. 
David Widerker has argued that Frankfurt stories built around preemp-
tion in this way are incompatible with supposing that morally responsible 
decisions are indeterministic. I, That is because the sign that clues the neu-
rosurgeon to intervene has to be causally connected with the victim's deci-
sion if the sign is to function for the neurosurgeon as a reliable indicator of 
the decision. But if the victim's decision is indeterministic, then it isn't 
causally determined by anything which precedes it, and there is no reliable 
sign of the sort needed by Frankfurt stories dependent on preemption. 
I sympathize with Widerker's objection. But Frankfurt stories need not 
be built around preemption. Instead, they can make use of the strong cor-
relation bctween mental and ncural states to allow the counterfactual inter-
vener to interrupt, rather than preempt, neural sequences correlated with 
acts of will. 
To understand how Frankfurt stories of the interruption sort work, it's 
necessary to recognize that the correlation between a mental act or state and 
the firings of neurons must be a one-many relation. When I suddenly recog-
nize my daughter's face across a crowded room, that one mental act of 
recognition, which to me feels sudden or even instantaneous, is correlated 
with many neural firings as information from the retina is sent through the 
optic nerve, relayed through the lateral geniculate nucleus of the thalamus, 
processed in various parts of the occipital cortex, which take account of fig-
ure, motion, orientation in space, and color, and then processed further in 
cortical association areas. Only when the whole sequence of neural firings is 
completed, do I have the mental act of recognizing my daughter. Whatever 
neural firings are correlated with an act of will or intellect, I take it that in 
this case, as in all others, the correlation between the mental act and the fir-
ing of the relevant neurons is a one-many relation.16 Unless Cartesian dual-
ism is correct, then, there is no mental act in an agent unless and until the 
correlated sequence of neural firings in that agent's brain is completed. 17 
It's important to be clear about this point. If the firing of the whole neural 
sequence correlated with a mental act is not completed, the result isn't some 
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truncated or incomplete mental act. It's no mental act at all. If the neural 
sequence correlated with my recognizing my daughter's face across a 
crowded room is interrupted at the level of the thalamus, say, then I will 
have no mental act having to do with seeing her. I won't, for example, think 
to myself, "For a moment there, I thought I saw my daughter, but now I'm 
not sure./I I won't have a sensation of almost but not quite seeing her. I 
won't have a premonition that I was about to see her, and then I mysteri-
ously just don't see her. I will simply have no mental act regarding recogni-
tion of her whatsoever. To suppose that there could be some sort of mental 
act, truncated, incomplete, or otherwise defective, when there is no com-
pleted neural sequence correlated with that mental act, is to accept some 
version of Cartesian dualism. It is to suppose that there can be a mental act 
without there being a completed neural sequence correlated with that men-
tal act. So if the neural sequence correlated with a mental act is interrupted, 
then that mental act doesn't occur. If there is any mental act at all in those 
circumstances, it will occur only because there is some other completed 
sequence of neural firings correlated with that mental act. So although a 
mental act such as a decision may feel, subjectively, as if it is simple and 
instantaneous, the neural sequence with which it is correlated is neither. 
This is enough to allow the neurosurgeon to control his victim without 
relying on the sorts of signs in the Frankfurt stories built around preemption. 
Given that human beings are made of matter, we can build a Frankfurt-style 
counterxample to PAP as an interruption story. In a Frankfurt story of the 
interruption sort, the neurosurgeon's instrument controls the victim in virtue 
of its ability to interrupt the neural sequence correlated with an act of will 
rather than by its ability to preempt that act itself, and yet it can also be true 
that in the actual sequence of events there is nothing which causally deter-
mines the victim's act of will. The features Widerker objects to in the pre-
emption stories are thus missing in the interruption stories. 
To see why this is so, it might help to consider what a Frankfurt interrup-
tion story looks like if we postulate the simplest sort of correlation between 
the mental and the neural. Suppose, per improbabile, that the mental and the 
neural are identical. Then any mental act will just be the firing of a whole 
neural sequence. With this presupposition, let it be the case that the neuro-
surgeon's victim, Jones, forms an act of will W. On our presupposition, 
there will then also be in Jones's brain a completed neural sequence N. And 
suppose further that W is an indeterministic act of will. If Wand N are iden-
tical, then this supposition entails that neural sequence N just fires, without 
being caused to fire by anything antecedent to it.IS Consequently, there can 
be no reliable prior sign of W. Nothing causally determines N or W, and so 
there is nothing prior to N or W which is a reliable sign of Nor W. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that even in such a world, a counterfactual inter-
vener could operate. That's because neural sequence N - even if it just 
begins to fire, without being caused to fire by anything prior - is composite 
and divisible. And that's enough to give the intervener scope to operate. 
The intervener can then use as his cue the beginning of that neural 
sequence. By intervening somewhere in the middle of the neural sequence, 
the intervener brings it about that the neural sequence isn't completed. 
Since the relation between a mental act or state and neural firings is a one-
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many relation, if the intervener intervenes to keep the neural sequence from 
being completed, he prevents the victim from forming the act of will W. But 
he does so without taking as his cue some prior cause of W. Instead, he 
operates on something which is identical to the mental act. 
I don't suppose that mental acts are really identical to the firing of neur-
al sequences. Whatever the right relation between the mental and the neur-
al is, I think it is a lot weaker than identity. 1 constructed the simple 
Frankfurt interruption story above with the supposition that the mental 
and the physical are identical for the sake of illustrating the difference 
between Frankfurt preemption stories and Frankfurt interruption stories, 
but a Frankfurt interruption story doesn't require that the relation between 
the mental and the neural be nearly so strong. It requires only that a mental 
act be strongly correlated with a neural sequence, in the way described 
above, and that the relation between them be a one-many relation. That is 
enough to allow the neurosurgeon to operate without relying on any prior 
state or event which causes the neural sequence or the act of will. 
Furthermore, if a neurosurgeon did intervene by interrupting a neural 
sequence in this way, then the victim would form no mental act; there 
would be nothing the victim does. The victim wouldn't have the mental act 
of engaging in the beginning of a decision. He wouldn't report his condi-
tion by saying, "I was just about to make a decision but then somehow I 
didn't", anymore than in the face recognition example in which the 
sequence of neural firings beginning in my retina was terminated in the 
thalamus I would report my condition by saying, "r was about to see my 
daughter but then 1 didn't" . Instead, the victim won't have any mental act 
or state to report. 
Or, to put the point another way, if the victim in a Frankfurt interrup-
tion story did have a mental act or state to report, there would be a com-
pleted neural sequence correlating with that mental act or state - and 
then the neurosurgeon could interrupt that neural sequence. 
In such a Frankfurt interruption story, then, the neurosurgeon can inter-
rupt the neural sequence correlated with a certain act of will, if he doesn't 
want that act of will on the victim's part, and he can use his coercive neuro-
logical mechanism to fire instead the neural sequence correlated with the 
act of will he wants the victim to form. The victim can thus be controlled 
by the intervener without there being anything which causally determines 
the victim's act of will in the actual sequence of events in which the neuro-
surgeon does not intervene. Since the intervener controls the victim, how-
ever, it will also be true that the victim couldn't form any act of will other 
than that act which the intervener wants the victim to have. Consequently, 
in a Frankfurt interruption story, it will be true that the victim's act of will, 
for which he is morally responsible, is indeterministic and yet that the vic-
tim cannot will otherwise than he does.19 
This does seem to me a good reason for libertarians to give up on PAP. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons given in the two main sections of this paper, then, Goetz is 
mistaken. Aquinas's account is appropriately designated 'libertarian', and 
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there are two species of libertarianism, not just one. Consequently, libertari-
ans need not be committed to PAP; one can reject PAP and still hold a 
species of libertarianism. Furthermore, Frankfurt interruption stories, which 
are compatible with libertarianism, provide a good reason for rejecting PAP. 
So, of the two species of libertarianism, the better one is Aquinas's, which 
doesn't require alternative possibilities for moral responsibility.CI! 
St. Louis University 
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ron in the sequence. 
17. If a neural sequence and a mental act or state are correlated in the way 
at issue here, then the neural sequence exists if and only if the correlated men-
tal act or state exists. To ward off the sort of confusion which sometimes arises 
in this connection in philosophy of mind, it is probably helpful to add that 
nothing in my presuppositions makes it necessary that mental acts and states 
be correlated with neural sequences in this way - there might be creatures for 
whom the mental is correlated with states of silicon instead, for example - or 
that there be one and only one neural sequence which is correlated in a law-
like way, for all human beings or even within the life of just one human per-
son, with one particular mental act or state. All that is required for the correla-
tion at issue here is that a particular embodied human being in this world be 
such that he has some mental state or engages in some mental act if and only if 
the neural sequence correlated with that act or state in him is completed. And, 
as I have explained, this is a position which even some dualists can accept. If a 
mental act or state in the soul is simultaneously mirrored by a neural state in 
the brain and vice versa, then if that neural state exists, it is true that the corre-
lated mental act or state does also, and if the neural state does not exist, it's true 
that the correlated mental act or state doesn't exist either. 
18. If there are indeterministic brain states, they are bound to be more com-
plicated than this; but the biology doesn't need to be perfectly right for the 
philosophical point. One attempt to provide a biologically acceptable account 
of indeterministic neural events can be found in Kane op. cit. While Kane's 
account is scientifically sophisticated, r don't think it is correct because it is 
reductionistic; as far as I can see, Kane limits any real indeterminism to the 
microphysical realm. 
19. Some philosophers have supposed that even in the most tightly con-
structed Frankfurt stories there is still a "Hicker of freedom". For an excellent 
discussion of the Hicker of freedom strategy, see John Martin Fischer, The 
Metaphysics of Free Will, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), chapter 7. See also my 
"Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility: the Flicker of Freedom", 
op.cit. 
20. I'm grateful to John Dupre, John Martin Fischer, and Norman 
Kretzmann for comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
